Homa Bay Senator Moses Kajwang’ wants ODM to learn from previous political partnerships before committing to President William Ruto’s 2027 re-election bid. His warning exposes a fundamental disagreement within the party: should political cooperation rest on goodwill, or must it be secured through a written agreement with clear obligations and accountability mechanisms?
NAIROBI, KENYA — 31 October 2026
Homa Bay Senator Moses Kajwang’ has called for caution in negotiations between the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and President William Ruto’s United Democratic Alliance (UDA), warning that the party must learn from historical political agreements before committing its support to the President’s 2027 re-election campaign.
Kajwang’ argued that ODM should approach the proposed partnership with a clear understanding of the risks involved, rather than relying exclusively on political goodwill.
“We must be careful out of historical experience. We can see those who are our friends, but allow us to apply a little bit of risk management in this arrangement.”
His remarks, reported by Daily Nation and The Star on October 29, come amid growing differences within ODM over whether the party should demand a formal written agreement before entering a pre-election coalition with UDA.
The disagreement has divided senior politicians over the terms of cooperation, the distribution of government positions, development commitments and the credibility of political promises.
For Kajwang’, the central concern is whether ODM can protect its interests if the political relationship changes after the election.
The debate is particularly significant because the party is negotiating its future political direction following the death of its founding leader, Raila Odinga.
Kajwang’: Political Cooperation Requires Risk Management
Kajwang’ compared political partnerships to relationships that require clearly understood commitments.
His argument is that previous political experiences demonstrate the need to establish expectations before entering an arrangement that could significantly affect ODM’s future.
Risk management in this context concerns identifying possible disagreements, determining the obligations of each partner and establishing procedures for resolving disputes.
A written agreement can provide a record of commitments and the conditions under which cooperation is expected to continue.
However, its practical effectiveness depends on the legality of its provisions, the institutions responsible for implementing them and the consequences of non-compliance.
Kajwang’s remarks therefore raise a question extending beyond the immediate negotiations.
What protections can a political party realistically obtain when it commits its organisational support to another party’s presidential candidate?
ODM Divided Between Written Guarantees and Political Goodwill
The disagreement within ODM has produced two identifiable positions.
One group argues that President Ruto has already demonstrated goodwill through development projects, Cabinet appointments and cooperation with leaders from ODM’s traditional strongholds.
Uriri MP Mark Nyamita has questioned the need to make a written agreement a condition for continued cooperation.
He has cited road projects, markets and government appointments as evidence of the administration’s willingness to work with ODM-aligned regions.
Nyando MP Jared Okello has advanced a similar position.
Okello argues that a written agreement cannot guarantee that political commitments will be honoured.
He has cited historical partnerships involving former Presidents Daniel arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki to illustrate his concern that signed political understandings may still be disregarded.
The opposing position is that goodwill, while politically relevant, cannot replace clearly documented obligations.
Kajwang’, Alego Usonga MP Sam Atandi, Migori Woman Representative Fatuma Mohammed and other ODM politicians have argued for greater clarity before the party makes a formal commitment.
Atandi has warned that parties entering negotiations without defined terms may find themselves disadvantaged if other political partners secure commitments first.
Fatuma Mohammed has used the analogy of a marriage certificate to argue that ODM should formalise any partnership through recognised party procedures.
These competing positions reflect different assessments of political risk.
They do not establish that either approach would guarantee a particular outcome.
Why Previous Political Agreements Matter
Kenya’s political history provides several examples of coalition arrangements that subsequently generated disputes over implementation.
One frequently cited example concerns the National Rainbow Coalition, which brought together political groups ahead of the 2002 General Election.
The coalition’s internal disagreements over power sharing and constitutional reform became prominent during President Mwai Kibaki’s administration.
The political understandings associated with that period remain part of public debate about the reliability of coalition commitments.
ODM politicians have also referred to the cooperation between Raila Odinga and former President Daniel arap Moi.
These examples help explain why some party leaders are concerned about agreements that may be politically negotiated but difficult to enforce.
However, historical disputes should be examined individually.
Different arrangements were made under different constitutional and political conditions.
The fact that an earlier agreement became disputed does not establish that every subsequent coalition agreement will fail.
Similarly, historical experience does not demonstrate that informal political cooperation is necessarily more reliable than a written pact.
The appropriate lesson is that the structure, clarity and implementation mechanisms of an agreement matter.
The Proposed 50–50 Power-Sharing Formula
The debate has become more consequential because senior ODM politicians have publicly advocated an equal power-sharing arrangement with UDA.
Homa Bay Governor Gladys Wanga has proposed a formula under which the two parties would share government positions equally if they formed the next administration.
Her proposal includes the Deputy President’s position for ODM if UDA provides the presidential candidate, alongside an equal distribution of Cabinet positions.
The formula has also featured in statements by other senior ODM officials.
However, the proposed arrangement is a negotiating position, not an established agreement.
It has not been demonstrated that UDA has formally accepted the terms or that all the necessary party approvals have been completed.
The Deputy President’s position is currently occupied by Kithure Kindiki, whose continued participation in future electoral arrangements has also been publicly discussed.
Any proposed distribution of senior positions would therefore have implications beyond ODM and UDA’s bilateral negotiations.
It could affect existing political relationships and the constitutional processes governing appointments.
Can Political Parties Guarantee Cabinet Positions?
One of the most important legal questions concerns whether a coalition agreement can guarantee specific government appointments.
Kenya’s Constitution establishes procedures for appointing the Deputy President, Cabinet Secretaries and other senior public officials.
The Deputy President is elected as part of the presidential ticket under the applicable constitutional framework.
Cabinet Secretaries are appointed through a constitutional process involving presidential nomination and National Assembly approval.
A coalition agreement cannot override these requirements.
Consequently, a promise to allocate a particular Cabinet position must be distinguished from the legal authority required to make the appointment.
Political partners can negotiate proposed allocations and establish internal expectations.
However, those commitments must operate within the Constitution and applicable legislation.
A document promising a 50–50 distribution would therefore need to specify what the parties are actually undertaking to do and which commitments remain subject to constitutional approval.
Without that distinction, political expectations could be presented as guarantees that the agreement itself cannot legally deliver.
What Makes a Coalition Agreement Meaningful?
A written political agreement can serve several functions.
It can identify the participating parties, establish their common objectives and define the political arrangements they intend to pursue.
It can also provide procedures for decision-making, consultation, implementation and dispute resolution.
For ODM and UDA, a comprehensive agreement could address the following areas.
The scope of cooperation: Whether the parties intend to cooperate only during the presidential election, form a pre-election coalition or establish a broader governing arrangement.
The allocation of political responsibilities: How the parties propose to distribute roles while respecting constitutional appointment requirements.
Policy commitments: The legislative, economic and governance priorities they intend to pursue together.
Decision-making arrangements: How coalition partners will approve major decisions and resolve disagreements.
Dispute resolution: The internal procedures to be followed when one party alleges that the other has failed to honour a commitment.
Review and termination: The circumstances under which the agreement may be amended, suspended or ended.
These provisions would not eliminate political risk.
They would, however, make the parties’ stated obligations easier to identify and assess.
The Difference Between Political and Legal Enforceability
Kajwang’s warning also raises an important distinction between political commitments and legally enforceable obligations.
A political promise may create expectations among party members and supporters without necessarily creating a contractual obligation enforceable through the courts.
A formal coalition agreement may have legal significance under the Political Parties Act, depending on its terms, registration and compliance with applicable requirements.
However, not every clause in such an agreement is necessarily enforceable in the same way.
For example, a commitment to pursue a particular policy may depend on parliamentary approval, budgetary resources or future government decisions.
Similarly, an agreement concerning political appointments cannot compel constitutional institutions to disregard their lawful responsibilities.
A credible assessment of any ODM–UDA agreement would therefore need to examine both its political commitments and its legal effect.
The existence of a signed document is important evidence of what the parties agreed.
It is not, by itself, proof that every commitment can be compelled through legal proceedings.
Who Has the Authority to Negotiate for ODM?
Another central issue concerns the institutional authority of those conducting negotiations.
Homa Bay Town MP Peter Opondo Kaluma has said that technical teams representing ODM and UDA are discussing the terms of cooperation.
According to The Star, the joint broad-based committee is co-chaired by Carey Orege for ODM and Emmanuel Nzai for UDA.
Kaluma has maintained that the discussions are expected to produce a written agreement.
However, negotiations by technical representatives should be distinguished from final approval by the participating political parties.
ODM’s constitution and governing organs determine who may authorise major political arrangements on behalf of the party.
A January 2026 decision by ODM’s Central Management Committee reportedly authorised structured pre-election coalition discussions, with a resulting framework expected to undergo ratification through the party’s National Delegates Convention.
This distinction matters because an agreement negotiated by representatives does not necessarily become binding on the party before the required approvals are obtained.
The public should therefore be able to distinguish between negotiating proposals, committee recommendations, approved party resolutions and a formally concluded coalition agreement.
Oburu Oginga Defends ODM’s Negotiating Autonomy
The debate intensified on October 29 when ODM party leader Oburu Oginga issued a statement responding to attempts to influence the party’s negotiating position.
Oburu maintained that ODM has established leadership structures capable of determining its political direction.
He criticised individuals outside the party who were attempting to prescribe how its negotiations with UDA should proceed.
The statement, reported on October 30, reaffirmed the party’s institutional autonomy and the importance of its established procedures.
Oburu’s intervention is significant because it places the authority to negotiate within ODM’s formal structures rather than leaving the issue to individual public declarations.
It does not, however, establish that all the outstanding terms of cooperation have been agreed.
The final position will depend on the negotiations, the decisions of the relevant party organs and any agreement subsequently adopted.
The Role of the 10-Point Agenda
The ODM–UDA relationship is also connected to the 10-point agenda agreed between President Ruto and Raila Odinga in March 2025.
The agenda included commitments concerning governance, constitutional and electoral issues, devolution, economic challenges and other public-interest priorities.
ODM leaders have continued to refer to its implementation as part of the broader political relationship.
For an evidence-based assessment, the agenda should be treated separately from any proposed 2027 power-sharing agreement.
One concerns previously announced governance commitments.
The other concerns potential future political cooperation and the distribution of responsibilities.
Progress on the 10-point agenda should be assessed through documented government actions, legislative changes, budgetary decisions and independently verifiable outcomes.
The existence of a political understanding does not establish that all its commitments have been implemented.
Likewise, the announcement of a future coalition arrangement would not automatically resolve outstanding obligations under an earlier agreement.
Can Development Projects Substitute for a Written Pact?
Supporters of cooperation without additional conditions have cited government development projects as evidence of goodwill.
Their argument is that visible investment and appointments demonstrate the administration’s willingness to work with ODM constituencies.
However, public infrastructure and political agreements should be assessed through different accountability frameworks.
Roads, markets, electricity and water projects are public investments implemented through government institutions and funded through legally authorised processes.
Their value should be measured through expenditure, completion, service delivery and public benefit.
A political coalition agreement, by contrast, establishes expectations between participating political organisations.
The existence of public development projects does not automatically demonstrate that future political commitments will be honoured.
Equally, a signed coalition agreement does not guarantee that development projects will be completed.
Both require their own implementation and accountability mechanisms.
DatalytIQs Political Intelligence Assessment
Kajwang’s intervention identifies several institutional risks that can be examined without making assumptions about the eventual outcome of the negotiations.
First, ambiguity creates room for competing interpretations. A coalition arrangement that does not clearly define obligations may allow political partners to develop different expectations about what was agreed.
Second, constitutional limitations matter. Negotiated promises concerning senior public appointments must remain consistent with the Constitution.
Third, party authorisation is essential. Technical negotiations should be followed by the approvals required under the parties’ governing documents.
Fourth, dispute resolution should be defined before disagreements arise. An agreement is easier to administer when it identifies the procedures for consultation, review and handling alleged breaches.
Fifth, political commitments require measurable implementation. Where parties promise policy reforms or development priorities, progress should be assessed against identifiable actions and outcomes.
These considerations explain the institutional questions behind Kajwang’s call for risk management.
They do not establish that a written agreement would necessarily succeed or that cooperation based on goodwill would necessarily fail.
What Should Be Monitored Before 2027?
The next developments should be assessed through documentary evidence.
The negotiating committee’s report would help establish which issues have been discussed and whether the parties have reached consensus.
Any proposed coalition agreement should be examined for its scope, signatories, approval procedures, implementation commitments and dispute-resolution provisions.
Formal resolutions by ODM and UDA would clarify whether their governing institutions have endorsed the arrangement.
The public should also distinguish between agreed commitments and demands that remain under negotiation.
For development and policy pledges, relevant indicators should include legislative action, approved budgets, implementation milestones and independently verified service-delivery outcomes.
Finally, any coalition registration requirements should be assessed under the Political Parties Act and the procedures administered by the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties.
Conclusion: Political Trust and Written Commitments Are Different Questions
Moses Kajwang’s warning has brought an important governance issue into ODM’s negotiations with President William Ruto.
The Homa Bay Senator argues that previous political experiences justify caution before the party makes commitments affecting its future.
Other ODM leaders maintain that the President’s cooperation and development record demonstrate sufficient goodwill to continue the relationship without imposing additional conditions.
Both positions form part of an ongoing political debate.
The eventual significance of any agreement will depend on its terms, legal status, institutional approval and implementation.
A written pact can document expectations and establish procedures.
Political goodwill can support cooperation and the implementation of commitments.
Neither removes the need for accountability.
A political agreement records what leaders promise. Its real significance lies in whether the commitments are lawful, transparent and implemented.
For ODM and UDA, those questions will remain central as negotiations continue ahead of the 2027 General Election.
DatalytIQs News — Beyond the Headlines. Into the Evidence.
Sources and References
- The Star — Oburu’s ODM split over written Ruto pact ahead of 2027, 29 October 2026.
- Daily Nation — Written pact or goodwill? Fresh split in ODM over Ruto 2027 deal, 29 October 2026.
- Citizen Digital — Oburu shuts down calls for written ODM–UDA agreement, 30 October 2026.
- Capital FM — Oburu dismisses calls for written pre-2027 deal with UDA by ODM outsiders, 30 October 2026.
- The Star — Omollo questions ODM push for written pact with Ruto ahead of 2027 polls, 26 October 2026.
- Office of the Registrar of Political Parties — Official information on political party registration, coalitions and statutory compliance.
- Kenya Law — Constitution of Kenya, Political Parties Act and relevant electoral legislation.